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OPINION OF THE COURT
____________
BARRY, Circuit Judge
This is a dispute over the disposition of proceeds from
a decedent’s ERISA-governed 401(k) plan. The decedent,
William Kensinger (“William”) was married to Adele
Kensinger (“Adele”) until their divorce in 2008. As part of
their divorce decree, Adele waived her right to the proceeds
of William’s 401(k) plan. William, however, neglected to
replace Adele as the designated beneficiary of his 401(k) plan
prior to his death a few months after the divorce. His estate
(“the Estate”) and Adele both claimed a right to the plan
proceeds, leading to this litigation. In light of a recent
Supreme Court case, there is no dispute that, notwithstanding
Adele’s waiver, the plan administrator is obligated to pay the
401(k) proceeds to her in accordance with the plan
documents. The question before us, which is one of first
impression in this circuit, is this: after the plan administrator
distributes the funds to Adele, can the Estate attempt to
recover the funds by bringing suit directly against Adele to
enforce her waiver? For the reasons that follow, we hold that
the Estate can sue Adele to enforce her waiver and recover the
disputed plan proceeds. The District Court, however, held to
the contrary. Accordingly, although we affirm in part, we will
2

also reverse in part.
I. Background
A. Factual Background
The material facts in this case are straightforward and
undisputed. In 2000, William enrolled in an employeesponsored deferred savings plan (“401(k) plan”) through his
employer, URL Pharma, Inc. (“URL”). The 401(k) plan was
governed by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
(“ERISA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461. At the time of his
enrollment, William was married to Adele, whom he
designated as the plan’s primary beneficiary. Their marriage
did not last, however, and divorce proceedings commenced in
2008. On April 20, 2008, William and Adele entered into a
Property Settlement Agreement (“PSA”), which, in relevant
part, provided:
[T]he parties mutually agree to waive, release,
and relinquish any and all right, title and interest
either may have in and to the other’s IRA
account(s), or any other such retirement benefit
and deferred savings plan of like kind and
character, and neither shall make any claim to
possession of such property as it is presently
titled.
The divorce was then finalized in New Jersey state court, with
a final divorce decree incorporating the PSA entered on July
10, 2008.
Nine months after the divorce, William died intestate
without having changed the designated beneficiary of his
401(k) plan. Following his death, a dispute arose regarding
distribution of the plan proceeds. Although Adele was still
the named beneficiary of the 401(k) plan, the Estate argued
that, given her waiver, it was entitled to the proceeds of the
plan. Adele countered that ERISA, which requires that the
proceeds be paid to the beneficiary named in the plan
documents, trumped her common law waiver. On November
3

9, 2009, the Estate filed an action against Adele and URL in
the Superior Court of New Jersey seeking a declaration that
the Estate was entitled to the funds in the 401(k) account. 1
URL removed the matter to the District Court.
B. The Supreme Court’s Decision in Kennedy
The leading case in this area is Kennedy v. Plan
Administrator for DuPont Savings & Investment Plan, 555
U.S. 285 (2009). The facts in Kennedy are virtually identical
to those in this case. In Kennedy, an employee participated in
an ERISA employee pension benefit plan and designated his
wife as the sole beneficiary. The couple subsequently
divorced, and as part of the divorce decree the wife agreed to
waive her interest in her husband’s pension plan. However,
the husband died without amending the pension plan
documents to replace his ex-wife as the designated
beneficiary. The husband’s estate claimed a right to the plan
proceeds, citing the ex-wife’s waiver. The plan administrator,
however, relied on the husband’s designation form and paid
the funds to the ex-wife. The husband’s estate then sued the
plan administrator to recover the benefits.
The district court granted summary judgment to the
estate and ordered the plan administrator to pay the estate.
The Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that the ex-wife’s waiver
was rendered void by ERISA’s anti-alienation provision,
which states that “benefits provided under the plan may not be
assigned or alienated.” 2
29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(1). The
1

As of March 31, 2011, the balance of the 401(k) account
was $76,242.41. On October 5, 2011, the District Court
entered an order memorializing the parties’ agreement that
URL would deposit the plan proceeds with the Court and
would thereafter be dismissed from the action.
2
By statute, this anti-alienation provision does not apply to a
certain class of orders known as “qualified domestic relations
orders” (“QDROs”). 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3). To qualify as a
QDRO, an order must satisfy certain statutory requirements,
such as clearly specifying an alternate payee, the amount of
benefits to be paid to the alternate payee, the period to which
4

Supreme Court affirmed, albeit on different grounds.
Contrary to the Fifth Circuit, the Court held that the ex-wife’s
waiver “did not constitute an assignment or alienation
rendered void [by ERISA’s anti-alienation provision]” and
therefore was not invalidated by ERISA. Kennedy, 555 U.S.
at 297 (emphasis added). Nonetheless, the Court declared
that a plan administrator is “obliged to act ‘in accordance with
the documents and instruments governing the plan,’” and that
“ERISA provides no exemption from this duty when it comes
time to pay benefits.” Id. at 300 (quoting 29 U.S.C. §
1104(a)(1)(D)). Thus, although the ex-wife had waived her
right to the pension, the Court concluded that the plan
administrator “did its statutory ERISA duty by paying the
benefits to [the ex-wife] in conformity with the plan
documents.” Id. at 299-300. In adopting this so-called “plan
documents rule,” the Court emphasized the desirability of a
“straightforward rule of hewing to the directives of the plan
documents.” Id. at 300.
Significantly, although the Supreme Court held that a
plan administrator must distribute benefits in accordance with
plan documents, it noted the open question of whether another
avenue of recovery might be available to the estate. In a
footnote, the Court made clear that its holding did not address
the question of whether the estate could have sued the ex-wife
to recover the benefits after she received them from the plan
administrator. Id. at 299 n.10 (“Nor do we express any view
as to whether the Estate could have brought an action in state
or federal court against [the ex-wife] to obtain the benefits
after they were distributed.”). In light of this footnote, lower
courts interpreting Kennedy have observed that “the Supreme
Court may have closed one door to litigation against plan
administrators but it may well have opened another to
litigation between family or former family members.”
Staelens v. Staelens, 677 F. Supp. 2d 499, 507 (D. Mass.
2010).
the order applies, and the specific plan impacted by the order.
§ 1056(d)(3)(B). It is undisputed that the PSA which contains
Adele’s waiver is not a QDRO.
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C. The District Court’s Decision
Adele moved for summary judgment on the ground
that she was entitled to the 401(k) proceeds as the named
beneficiary. The Estate opposed the motion and cross-moved
for summary judgment, arguing that the PSA was a valid
contractual waiver and that the proceeds, therefore, belonged
to the Estate. Properly relying on Kennedy, the District Court
had little trouble concluding that, despite Adele’s waiver,
ERISA required URL to distribute the 401(k) funds to her, as
the named beneficiary, in accordance with the plan
documents. This conclusion is not challenged on appeal.
The District Court then turned to the question left open
in Kennedy: whether, once the plan proceeds are distributed to
Adele, the Estate may pursue a claim directly against her to
enforce her waiver and recover the benefits. 3 Concluding that
allowing the Estate to sue Adele would undermine one of
ERISA’s “principal objectives”—namely, that “named
beneficiaries actually receive the benefits of ERISA-governed
plans”—the District Court held that “the Estate may not assert
a claim against [Adele] regarding the 401(k) proceeds.”
(App. at 7-8.) This appeal followed.
II. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review
The 401(k) plan at issue in this dispute is an “employee
welfare benefit plan” within the meaning of ERISA, 29
U.S.C. § 1002(1). As such, the District Court had jurisdiction
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. We have jurisdiction pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and exercise plenary review over this
appeal from the grant of summary judgment. McGowan v.
3

Although the 401(k) proceeds have yet to be distributed by
URL to Adele, this question is ripe for review because, under
Kennedy and in accordance with the District Court’s
unchallenged holding, URL is obligated by law to distribute
the funds to Adele pursuant to the plan documents. As such,
Adele has a presently enforceable right to the plan proceeds,
and the Estate has standing to challenge that right by seeking
to enforce Adele’s waiver.
6

NJR Serv. Corp., 423 F.3d 241, 244 (3d Cir. 2005), abrogated
on other grounds, Kennedy, 55 U.S. at 291 n.4.
III. Discussion
Enacted in 1974, ERISA remains a comprehensive and
complex scheme for regulating employee benefits plans.
“The statute, however, does not address many of the issues
which arise in the normal course of the administration of such
plans.” Teamsters Pension Trust Fund v. Littlejohn, 155 F.3d
206, 208 (3d Cir. 1998). In such cases, “it is well settled that
Congress intended that the federal courts would fill in the
gaps by developing, in light of reason, experience, and
common sense, a federal common law of rights and
obligations imposed by the statute.” Einhorn v. M.L.
Ruberton Constr. Co., 632 F.3d 89, 96-97 (3d Cir. 2011)
(citation and internal quotations omitted). Relevant to this
case, ERISA does not address whether a waiver of benefits
can be enforced through a direct suit against a named
beneficiary once the benefits have been paid to that
beneficiary. We, therefore, look to federal common law in
answering that question and, as stated above, answer it in the
affirmative.
A. ERISA’s Policy Rationale
Kennedy produced what appears to be a somewhat odd
result given that the Supreme Court held that a plan
administrator must adhere to the plan documents and
distribute plan proceeds to the named beneficiary even though
that beneficiary had affirmatively waived any claim to those
funds.
The Court emphasized two important policy
considerations in explaining its holding. First, it stated that
ERISA’s well-established policy favoring uniform and
efficient plan administration would be undermined if
employers had to consider benefits claims from sources
extrinsic to the plan documents, and it stressed the desirability
of a “straightforward rule . . . that lets employers ‘establish a
uniform administrative scheme, with a set of standard
procedures to guide processing of claims and disbursement of
benefits.’” 555 U.S. at 300 (quoting Egelhoff v. Egelhoff, 532
7

U.S. 141, 148 (2001)). Without such a simple rule, the Court
explained, plan administrators would have to bear “the cost of
less certain rules”:
Plan administrators would be forced to examine
a multitude of external documents that might
purport to affect the dispensation of benefits
and be drawn into litigation like this over the
meaning and enforceability of purported
waivers. . . . [I]t would destroy a plan
administrator’s ability to look at the plan
documents and records conforming to them to
get clear distribution instructions, without going
into court.
Id. at 301 (citation and internal quotation omitted); see also
Egelhoff, 532 U.S. at 149-50 (discussing “the congressional
goal of minimizing the administrative and financial burdens
on plan administrators”).
Second, the Supreme Court explained that its holding
was necessary in order to avoid subjecting plan administrators
to potential double liability. As the Court noted, ERISA
makes clear that plan administrators must pay benefits “in
accordance with the documents and instruments governing the
plan.” 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(D). As such, allowing the
estate in Kennedy to sue the plan administrator for disbursing
plan proceeds to the named beneficiary would have placed the
administrator in a hopeless bind: if it honored the waiver, it
could be sued by the named beneficiary for disregarding the
mandate of ERISA; if it honored the plan documents, it could
be sued by the estate for disregarding a federal common law
waiver.
These two concerns—the need for the straightforward
administration of plans and the avoidance of potential double
liability—while central to the Supreme Court’s decision in
Kennedy, are not implicated here. An action brought directly
against Adele after the benefits have been distributed would
in no way complicate URL’s administration of the plan.
Unlike in Kennedy, a post-distribution suit against Adele
8

would neither “destroy a plan administrator’s ability . . . to get
clear distribution instructions, without going to court” nor
subject URL to “litigation-fomenting ambiguities.” 555 U.S.
at 301, 302 (citation and internal quotations omitted). Rather,
a suit against Adele would simply require a court to determine
the rightful recipient of the plan proceeds as a matter of
contract law. 4
Although the District Court understood that the
concerns underlying Kennedy did not apply under the
circumstances of this case, it stated that in addition to “tidy
and cost-effective plan administration,” ERISA’s statutory
scheme also aims to “provid[e] certainty regarding the final
distribution of ERISA benefits” to beneficiaries. (App. at 8,
10.) Accordingly, the Court concluded that the possibility of
a post-distribution action against a beneficiary would be
inimical to ERISA’s purposes as it would undermine this
“core objective[]” of the statute. (Id. at 8-10.) Although the
Court’s conclusion was not unreasonable, we believe that its
assumption about ERISA’s continuing solicitude for
beneficiaries after the distribution of benefits was based on an
overreading of Kennedy.
The District Court relied heavily on Kennedy’s
4

Allowing a post-distribution suit to be brought directly
against a named beneficiary would also make sense as a
practical matter. First, it would permit the two interested
parties to litigate against each other directly, without the plan
administrator being caught in the middle. See Boyd v. Metro.
Life Ins. Co., 636 F.3d 138, 144 (4th Cir. 2011) (discussing
the undesirability of plan administrators having to “throw[]
themselves squarely into the center of contentious family
disputes”). Second, it would avoid the anomalous scenario in
which a valid waiver is rendered worthless because it cannot
be enforced against anyone; indeed, the District Court
acknowledged the argument that “it does not make sense that
the Supreme Court would uphold the validity of common law
waivers, but nevertheless hold that ERISA bars a claim to
enforce common law waivers.” (App. at 12)(conceding that
the argument “has merit”).
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statement that the plan documents rule promotes “simple
administration, avoid[s] double liability, and ensur[es] that
beneficiaries get what’s coming quickly, without the folderol
essential under less-certain rules.” 555 U.S. at 301 (quoting
Fox Valley & Vicinity Constr. Workers Pension Fund v.
Brown, 897 F.2d 275, 283 (7th Cir. 1990) (Easterbrook, J.,
dissenting) (emphasis added)). The emphasized portion of
this statement should not, however, be read in a vacuum or
divorced from the context in which it arose. Both Kennedy
and Fox Valley involved suits against plan administrators who
had yet to distribute benefits. When read with that in mind,
the goal of ensuring that beneficiaries “get what’s coming
quickly” refers to the expeditious distribution of funds from
plan administrators, not to some sort of rule providing
continued shelter from contractual liability to beneficiaries
who have already received plan proceeds. In this case, when
URL pays the benefits to Adele, as it must, she will “get
what’s coming” under the plan. If, after distribution, her right
to these funds is challenged because of her common law
waiver, that challenge will be litigated as an ordinary contract
dispute. Accordingly, to the extent that ERISA is concerned
with the expeditious payment of plan proceeds to
beneficiaries, permitting suits against beneficiaries after
benefits have been paid does not implicate any concern of
expeditious payment or undermine any core objective of
ERISA. 5

5

In support of its conclusion that ERISA continues to protect
beneficiaries post-distribution, the District Court also relied
on the following introductory language from ERISA’s
opening section: “It is hereby declared to be the policy of this
Act to protect interstate commerce and the interest of
participants in employee benefit plans and their
beneficiaries.” 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b) (emphasis added); see
also Boggs v. Boggs, 520 U.S. 833, 845 (1997) (“The
principal object of the statute is to protect plan participants
and beneficiaries.”). The mere mention of “beneficiaries” in
the statute’s introductory language, however, hardly leads to
the conclusion that a contractual waiver of benefits cannot be
enforced after a beneficiary has been paid the plan proceeds.
10

B. Analogous Case Law
Our conclusion finds further support in the decisions of
state appellate courts and in analogous federal cases. The
state appellate courts to have considered the question
presented here—the Michigan Supreme Court, the Oklahoma
Court of Civil Appeals, and the Court of Appeals of
Georgia—have all held that an estate may enforce a common
law waiver against a designated beneficiary once pension
funds have been distributed. See Sweebe v. Sweebe, 712
N.W.2d 708 (Mich. 2006); Pardee v. Pardee, 112 P.3d 308
(Okla. Civ. App. 2004); Alcorn v. Appleton, 708 S.E.2d 390
(Ga. Ct. App. 2011). In Sweebe, the Michigan Supreme Court
not only anticipated the holding of Kennedy, but answered the
question left open in Kennedy:
[W]hile a plan administrator must pay benefits
to the named beneficiary as required by ERISA,
this does not mean that the named beneficiary
cannot waive her interest in retaining these
proceeds. Once the proceeds are distributed, the
consensual terms of a prior contractual
agreement may prevent the named beneficiary
from retaining those proceeds.
712 N.W.2d at 156. Similarly, in Pardee, the Oklahoma court
held that a waiver could be enforced via a suit against a
named beneficiary because the “pension plan funds were no
longer entitled to ERISA protection once the plan funds were
distributed.” 112 P.3d at 315-16. And in Alcorn, the Court of
Appeals of Georgia relied on both Sweebe and Pardee to hold
that a decedent’s estate could bring suit against the decedent’s
ex-wife to enforce her waiver since she had already received
the plan benefits from the plan administrator. 708 S.E.2d at
392.
That the Estate should be able to bring a postdistribution suit against Adele finds further support in a line
of federal cases holding that creditors can sue named
beneficiaries to recover plan benefits once those benefits have
been distributed. A number of circuits, including our own,
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have held that even though ERISA prevents a creditor from
encumbering pension funds held by a plan administrator, the
funds are no longer entitled to ERISA’s protections against
the creditor’s claims once they are paid to the beneficiary.
See Trucking Emps. of N. Jersey Welfare Fund v. Colville, 16
F.3d 52, 55 (3d Cir. 1994) (“We have recognized . . . a
difference between funds remaining in the possession of an
ERISA plan trustee and funds that have been distributed to
the beneficiary.”); see also Kickham Hanley P.C. v. Kodak
Ret. Income Plan, 558 F.3d 204, 211 (2d Cir. 2009) (“Only
once the proceeds of the pension plan have been released to
the beneficiary’s hands, can creditors and others pursue
claims against the funds and the funds’ owner(s).”);
DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cox, 447 F.3d 967, 974 (6th Cir.
2006) (“This circuit, along with a majority of the other
circuits, has held that once benefit payments have been
disbursed to a beneficiary, creditors may encumber the
proceeds.”); Hoult v. Hoult, 373 F.3d 47, 54-55 (1st Cir.
2004) (same); United States v. Jackson, 229 F.3d 1223, 1225
(9th Cir. 2000) (same), overruled in part by United States v.
Novak, 476 F.3d 1041 (9th Cir. 2007); Guidry v. Sheet Metal
Workers Int’l Ass’n, Local No. 9, 10 F.3d 700, 716 (10th Cir.
1993) (same). In each of these cases, the court held that once
the benefits were distributed to the designated beneficiary in
accordance with the plan documents, ERISA was no longer
implicated. The same principle is equally applicable here.
More specifically, if a creditor can enforce its rights against a
beneficiary once pension funds have been distributed, we see
no reason why the Estate should not be able to enforce its
contractual rights against Adele once URL disburses the
funds.
Despite this caselaw, Adele argues that the District
Court should be affirmed in light of Boggs v. Boggs, 520 U.S.
833 (1997), and Staelens v. Staelens, cited earlier. We find
neither case to be persuasive under the circumstances of this
case. In Boggs, the Supreme Court held that ERISA
preempted a state community property law, and stated that
“the diversion of retirement benefits will occur regardless of
whether the interest in the pension plan is enforced against the
plan or the recipient of the pension benefit.” 520 U.S. at 853.
12

The “interest” at issue in Boggs, however, was an “interest in
undistributed pension plan benefits.” Id. at 836 (emphasis
added). Here, of course, the question is whether the Estate
can sue Adele after the funds have been distributed to her. 6
Staelens is similarly inapposite. There, the District
Court of Massachusetts held that a decedent’s estate could not
sue the decedent’s ex-wife to enforce her purported waiver,
but based its decision on the fact that the language of the
divorce decree “lack[ed] the specificity” required for a valid
common law waiver. 677 F. Supp. 2d at 510. Prior to
reaching this conclusion, the court did state that allowing a
decedent’s estate to sue a named beneficiary to enforce a
waiver “would appear to go against the various interests
6

Other courts considering the question before us have held
that Boggs is distinguishable for the same reason. See
Pardee, 112 P.3d at 313-14 (“As Boggs involved predistribution funds as opposed to distributed funds, as in the
present case, this Court finds Boggs distinguishable and, here,
inapplicable.”); see also Sweebe, 712 N.W.2d at 713
(distinguishing Boggs on the ground that it involved
“proceeds from an undistributed pension plan”); Alcorn, 708
S.E.2d at 392 (finding Boggs unpersuasive because it
“involved pre-distribution funds still in control of the plan
administrator”). Boggs is further distinguishable because it
involved an attempted testamentary transfer of an interest in
pension benefits that constituted “a prohibited ‘assignment or
alienation’” under 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(1). 520 U.S. at 851.
The Boggs Court explained that Congress prohibited such
assignments out of a concern that “retirees could find their
retirement benefits reduced by substantial sums because they
have been diverted to testamentary recipients.” Id. at 852. In
this case, however, Adele’s waiver is a simple relinquishment
of benefits and not an attempt to assign benefits to another
party or to “divert” funds away from plan participants or
beneficiaries. Thus, the concern of Boggs—“that retirement
funds are there when a plan’s participants and beneficiaries
expect them”—is not implicated by a waiver that is no more
than “a mechanism for simply renouncing a claim to
benefits.” Kennedy, 555 U.S. at 296.
13

which the Supreme Court [in Kennedy] deemed served by a
uniform administrative scheme.” Id. at 508. The court,
however, then “acknowledge[d] that the First Circuit itself . . .
appears to have treated distributed funds differently, albeit in
a somewhat different context.” Id. (citing Hoult, 373 F.3d at
54). Recognizing what appeared to be the law of the circuit in
which it sat, the court avoided the question of whether the
estate could sue the ex-wife directly and instead based its
decision on narrow grounds related to the specificity of the
contract language.
C. Adele’s State Law Argument
Finally, Adele contends that even if we determine that
the Estate can bring suit against her to enforce her waiver, we
should nonetheless affirm the District Court because, despite
the fact that she waived her right to the 401(k) proceeds, 7
William, who died intestate, “chose to give his 401K to [her]
after he died.” (Appellees’ Br. at 5.) This argument was
neither raised in the District Court nor mentioned in the
Court’s opinion, and we do not address it further.
IV. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm in part and
reverse in part the order of the District Court. The cause will
be remanded to the District Court with instructions to assess
the necessity of a further remand to state court to address the
merits of any remaining state law issue.
7

Although the District Court did not address whether the
waiver contained in the PSA was valid as a matter of federal
common law, Adele concedes its validity. (See Appellees’
Br. at 5 [“Ms. Kensinger did indeed give up her right to Mr.
Kensinger’s 401K.”].) Moreover, the language of Adele’s
waiver is similar to waiver language that has been deemed
valid in other cases, see, e.g., Altobelli v. Int’l Bus. Machs.
Corp., 77 F.3d 78, 80-81 (4th Cir. 1996), overruled on other
grounds by Kennedy, 555 U.S. 285, and there is no suggestion
that Adele’s waiver was not knowing, not voluntary, or not
made in good faith.
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